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Joint Bank Accounts In Ohio
Daniel B. Close
Since the Supreme Court of Ohio, in 1926, decided the case of
Cleveland Trust Company v. Scobie' the validity of the joint and sur-
vivorship bank account as a means of passing assets from one person
to another at death has become securely established in Ohio. Despite
its serious shortcomings from an estate planning standpoint,2 the de-
vice is an extremely popular means of holding modest family assets.
Widespread use has inevitably resulted in many practical problems
incident to disputes between
TE AuTHOR (A.B., 1935, Dartmouth Col- living co-depositors, between
lege, LL.B., 1938, Western Reserve Univer- creditor and depositor, be-
sity, LLVM., 1958, Western Reserve University) tween the representative or
is a Cleveland attorney and associate counsel heirs of the deceased deposi-
of the Cleveland Trust Company. tor and the survivor, and
otherwise. Gradually, these
matters are becoming clarified, but in many respects the law of Ohio
is still unclear.
Acceptance of the survivorship feature in bank accounts followed
by some years the pronouncements of Ohio courts which recognized
the right of survivorship, the jus accrescendi, in real property. In
1826, a hundred years before the Scobie case, the Supreme Court of
Ohio in Sergeant v. Steinberger3 stated flatly that estates in joint ten-
ancy did not then exist in Ohio; that the jus accrescendi "is not
founded in principles of natural justice, nor in any reasons of policy
applicable to any society or institutions. But, on the contrary, it is
adverse to the understandings, habits and feelings of the people." 4
The deed in question contained no words expressing the right of sur-
vivorship. However, in 1842, in Lewis v. Baldwin,5 the Supreme
Court of Ohio upheld the right of survivorship under a deed to
Charles R. Baldwin and Mary Jane Baldwin "jointly, their heirs and
assigns, and to the survivor of them, his or her separate heirs and
assigns." The Court said that the survivor held title "not upon the
principle of survivorship, as an incident to joint tenancy, but as
grantee in fee, as survivor, by the operative words of the deed." 6
1. 114 Ohio St. 241, 151 NE. 373 (1926).
2. Consideration of the joint and survivorship bank account with respect to problems of
federal gift and estate taxation is not within the scope of this article.
3. 2 Ohio 305 (1826).
4. Id. at 306.
5. 11 Ohio 352 (1842).
6. Id. at 355.
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [September
Thus, with respect to real property, the Ohio courts approved the
right of survivorship when expressly spelled out, but refused to sanc-
tion the common-law estate in joint tenancy which incorporated the
right of survivorship without expressing it.7
Not until In re Estate of Hutchison,8 decided by the supreme
court in 1929, was there a full statement by that court of the Ohio
view with respect to joint tenancies. In that case the court upheld
the right of survivorship with respect to stock certificates where the
words of survivorship were spelled out. Stressing the contract be-
tween the parties, the court refused to view the arrangement as a
testamentary disposition. By the strong language of its opinion, the
supreme court did much to make the general principles theretofore
established for deeds of real property a part of the general law of
property of the state.
Probably because of unusual fact situations, none of the early
bank account cases reached the supreme court, and none made valu-
able contributions to this area of the law. 9 On the legislative side,
the principle of survivorship was recognized by statutes which pro-
tected banks' ° and savings and loan institutions" in paying funds to
the surviving depositor when the contract of deposit between the bank
or savings and loan institution and its depositors provided for such
payment. The statutes were not primarily concerned with rights be-
tween depositors, or of strangers to the contract, but were designed
to protect the paying institution.
7. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Wallace, 45 Ohio St. 152, 12 N.E. 439 (1887);
Tabler v. Wiseman, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 497 (Dist. Ct. 1852). For an analysis of the de-
velopment of the right of survivorship in Ohio see Martin, The Incidents of Survivorship in
Ohio, 3 OHIO ST. L.J. 48 (1936).
8. 120 Ohio St. 542, 166 N.E. 687 (1929).
9. Nixson v. Snyder, 1 Ohio L. Abs. 408 (Ct. App. 1923); Dempsey v. Brighton Bank &
Trust Co., 14 Ohio App. 170 (1921); Guitner v. McEowen, 99 Ohio App. 32, 124 N.E.2d
744 (1918); In re Estate of Morgan, 30 Ohio C.C. Dec. 101 (Ct. App. 1918); Sullivan v.
Sullivan, 12 Ohio L. Rep. 224 (Cin. Super. Ct. 1914).
10. 101 Ohio Laws 120 (1910). This enactment, which has been slightly changed, is now
contained in OHIO REV. CODE § 1105.09: "When a deposit is made in any bank or trust com-
pany transacting business in this state, in the name of two or more persons, payable to either
or the survivor, such deposit or part thereof or any interest or dividend thereon, may be paid
to either of said persons, whether the other is living or not, and the receipt or acquittance of
the person paid is a sufficient release and discharge of the bank for any payments so made."
11. 99 Ohio Laws § 28 (1908) (now OHIO REV. CODE § 1151.19): "A building and loan
association may receive money on deposit or stock deposits from any persons, firms, corpora-
tions, and courts, or their agents, officers, and appointees but shall not pay interest thereon
exceeding the legal rate. When such deposits are made to the joint account of two or more
persons, whether adults or minors, with a joint order to the association that such deposits or
any part thereof are to be payable on the order of any of such joint depositors, and to con-
tinue to be so payable notwithstanding the death or incapacity of one or more of the persons
making them, such account shall be payable to any of such survivors or order notwithstanding
such death or incapacity. No recovery shall be had against such association for amounts so
paid and charged to such account."
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The Scobie Case
With only the foregoing meager background of case and statutory
law, the supreme court in 1926 was called upon to decide the case of
Cleveland Trust Company v. Scobie.12 The facts were these:
Jerome Green'opened a savings account at the bank in his name
and the name of his sister, Annie Richardson, which was marked,
"either may draw, balance at death of either payable to survivor."
Both signed the signature card. The money deposited was all
Green's. He left the passbook at the bank, and Mrs. Richardson
never had possession of it and never used the account. Green wrote
Mrs. Richardson a letter in which he told her he wanted her to have
the balance in the account in the event of his death. After Green's
death his administrator sued the bank to recover the balance in the
account.
The trial court found that the money had all belonged to Green;
that he intended to retain dominion and control over it during his
lifetime; that there was no gift of the account, either causa mortis or
otherwise; and that accordingly the administrator was entitled to the
funds in the account. The court of appeals, one judge dissenting, af-
firmed the decision of the trial court, also on the ground that no gift
had been made, and that the deposit in the account was an attempted
testamentary disposition, invalid because not executed with the for-
mality of a will.
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals. Judge Allen
wrote the unanimous opinion of the court, which largely discounted
the "gift" theory. She said that this could not be a gift of funds in
specie because title passed from the depositor, Green, to the bank and
the bank became Green's debtor in the amount of the deposit. Hence,
the question was not whether Green made a gift of the fund in specie,
but whether he created in his sister a joint interest in the deposit equal
to his own. The court thought that although Green retained control,
it was not exclusive control, and that by doing all he could to place
the account within his sister's joint authority, Green, by contract,
created in his sister a present joint interest in the account equal to
his own, although subject to Green's right of termination.
The court refused to place significance upon the failure to deliver
the passbook, which, of course, would be material to the issue of
whether a gift had been made. The court said:
[U]pon deposit of an account the bank is constituted a debtor, and
when the depositor orders the bank to pay himself or another upon order
of either party, notifies the second party of the completed transaction
and secures her signature evidencing assent to the arrangement, he has
created in the second party by contract a joint interest in his right to the
deposit equal to his own.' 3
12. 114 Ohio St. 241, 151 N.E. 373 (1926).
13. Id. at 253, 151 N.E. at 377.
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The Scobie case, by definitely holding that the funds in the joint
and survivorship account passed directly to the survivor upon the
death of the first depositor to die, and were not part of the dece-
dent's estate, thus became the landmark case in Ohio. The result of
the Scobie case was of fundamental importance. Unfortunately, the
logic by which the court reached its decision was not clear. The court
ruled out the gift approach, but spoke of "donative intent." The
court said that Green "created" a joint interest in the account "by
contract." But it also said the transaction was consummated by de-
livery of the passbook, and it cited various cases involving gifts. Al-
though the Scobie case is generally believed to have removed Ohio
from the list of "gift theory" states, perhaps the court was only say-
ing that there was not a gift of money in specie, but a gift of a vested
interest which had been created by contract. It is a confusing de-
cision.
After the Scobie Case
In Oleff v. Hodapp,14 the theory of the Scobie case was employed
despite the fact that the surviving joint depositor had been convicted
of the murder of the other joint depositor. A majority of the court
was not impressed by the argument that payment to the surviving de-
positor in such circumstances would offend public policy. The court
observed that any nullification of the contract would have to be made
with the same formality as the original contract.5
In the Scobie case the passbook was left with the bank, presum-
ably being available at all times to either joint depositor. In Sage v.
Flueck,'6 the creator of a three-party account retained possession and
control of the passbook. Frances Schmitt opened an account in her
own name and in the name of her brother, Theodore Schmitt, and her
sister, Catherine Flueck, "payable to either or the survivor." Dur-
ing Frances' life, Theodore was allowed to make three withdrawals
and one was made in the signature of all three depositors. After
Frances' death, Theodore and Catherine each withdrew part of the
very substantial balance. Frances' will left everything to Theodore,
but without mentioning the account. Her executor sued Catherine
Flueck to recover the amount she had withdrawn after Frances'
death. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant, but the
court of appeals reversed on the ground that "there was no delivery
of the bank book and no consideration for the promise." The su-
preme court in turn reversed the court of appeals.
14. 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E. 838 (1935).
15. Judge Williams dissented for reasons of public policy, noting that each depositor had
only a relative right to withdraw while both lived, but that after the murder, the wrongdoer,
under the majority's view, had an absolute right to withdraw, thus dearly benefiting from
the murder. Id. at 446-47, 195 N.E. at 844.
16. 132 Ohio St. 377, 7 N.E.2d 802 (1937).
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The court said that the signature card and the passbook consti-
tuted a contract of deposit, an executed contract requiring no con-
sideration.
Under this contract of deposit, Frances Schmitt created and vested in
Theodore and Catherine, in praesenti, a joint interest in the deposit,
equal to her own .... 17
The court appeared to rest its decision on the intention of the
"creator" of the account as manifested by the contract of deposit.
It thought the intention to be clearly expressed and held that oral
testimony to contradict such written expression of intention was in-
competent.
Thus, if there is no ambiguity in the terms of the deposit contract,
under Sage v. Flueck the survivorship right expressed in such a con-
tract can not be attacked by parol evidence of a contrary intention.
Sage v. Flueck clarified and strengthened the rule of the Scobie
case, but it did so by departing entirely from any considerations of
gift. As in Oleff v. Hodapp, the court emphasized the creation of a
present vested right by the contract between the depositors. There-
fore, the decisions in the &cobie and Sage v. Flueck cases put Ohio in
the column of those states which have adopted the "contract" theory
rather than the "gift" theory of joint and survivorship accounts.'
However, in a strong dissenting opinion in Rhorbacker v. Citizens
Building Association Company,"' Judge Turner challenged the view
of the court that the beneficiary of the contract of deposit (i.e., the
survivor) need not be a party to the contract. In that case, Floy L.
Walker, a depositor in a building and loan association, directed the
association to withdraw funds from his account and to issue a certi-
ficate of deposit payable to himself "or Mrs. Sceva Stinebaugh
Walker or survivor. . . . This certificate may be placed inside my
savings account passbook which I left at your office for safe-keeping.
... I would not wish her advised of this transaction on my part un-
less she survived me."19  Mrs. Sceva Stinebaugh Walker signed no
signature card; in fact, she knew nothing of the deposit until after
Floy Walker's death.
A majority of the court took the position that Mrs. Walker's
participation in the contract was not necessary; that the contract be-
tween Floy Walker and the association created an immediate joint
and equal interest in the certificate; that no consideration was neces-
sary between the Walkers; and that Mrs. Walker was entitled to the
17. Id. at 381, 7 N.E.2d at 804. Further, the court, citing Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St.
432, 195 N.E. 838 (1935), stated that the present vested interest could in no way be
affected by the laws of descent and distribution. Moreover, exclusive possession of the pass-
book by the creator of the account was held to be "a material circumstance but not decisive of
the rights of the parties concerned." Sage v. Flueck, 132 Ohio St. 377, 382, 7 N.E.2d 802, 804
(1937).
18. 138 Ohio St. 273, 34 N.E.2d 751 (1941).
19. Id. at 274, 34 N.E.2d at 752.
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proceeds of the certificate. The court said that such a transaction
''possesses some of the characteristics of a contract for the benefit
of a third person, with respect to which this court has evinced a lib-
eral attitude in allowing the third person to enforce the contract. ' 20
But Judge Turner, with whom Judge Bettman concurred, pro-
tested that the majority opinion pushed the contract theory a step
farther than previous Ohio cases warranted; that theretofore joint
and survivorship accounts had been held not to be testamentary in
character "on the theory that at the inception of the deposit a con-
tract was entered into between the persons to whom the deposit was
made payable. 21  Judge Turner quoted a telling paragraph from
the opinion of the court in the case of In re Estate of Fulk,22 where
the court said: "The issue here concerns not the bank but the con-
tractual relationship of John and Ida Fulk with each other .... John
Fulk takes by virtue of the contract. He and Ida Fulk were joint
promisees, each agreeing that the other could withdraw the entire
amount.' '23
Judge Turner further suggested that although in the Scobie case
the court had rejected the gift theory in favor of a "present vested
interest" contractual theory, in fact, most of the cases cited by the
court had been decided on a gift basis.
There can be no doubt that Judge Turner's dissent spotlighted a
significant change in the court's attitude toward joint and survivor
accounts, and his analysis of the inconsistencies in the court's ration-
ale of such accounts makes eminent good sense.
Possession of the Passbook
It should be noted that where the right of survivorship is clearly
spelled out, the matter of the retention of the passbook has been
given less and less importance by the courts. This, of course, is con-
sistent with the contract theory. Possession of the passbook is very
relevant to the issue of a gift, but having departed from the gift
theory the courts need be less concerned with who had possession of
the passbook. In the Scobie case, the passbook was left with the
bank; in Sage v. Flueck, the creator of the account retained posses-
sion; in the Rhorbacker case, the certificate of deposit was left at the
bank, but the bank was adjured not to let the other depositor (the
survivor) know it; and in In re Estate of Hatch,24 the passbook was
delivered to the survivor the day after the account was created. In
each instance, the right of survivorship prevailed.
20. Id. at 276, 34 N.E.2d at 753.
21. Id. at 277, 34 N.E.2d at 753 (dissenting opinion).
22. 136 Ohio St. 233, 24 N.E.2d 1020 (1940). No words of survivorship appeared in the
contract. See note 44 infra and accompanying text.
23. Id. at 239-40, 24 N..2d at 1023.
24. 154 Ohio St. 149, 93 N.E.2d 588 (1950).
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In Vollmer v. Vollmer,25 the contract with the bank, which con-
tained a survivorship agreement, required both depositors (husband
and wife) to sign withdrawals. Despite the fact that the husband
at all times kept the passbook in his safe deposit box, to which he
alone had access, the court upheld the surviving wife's right to the
funds, dismissing the retention of the passbook as being a natural
precaution.
Particular emphasis was given to the intention of the parties at
the time the contract was entered into in In re Estate of Hatch.26
Mrs. Hatch had had an account in her own name for some time. She
had her daughter's name added to the account, both signing cards ex-
pressing a right of survivorship. The next day, the passbook was de-
livered to the daughter, and on that day, Mrs. Hatch, who was bed-
fast, told her daughter to pay Mrs. Hatch's funeral expenses from
the account, give "Aunt Ella" $500, and divide the balance between
the daughter and her sister. On exceptions to the executor's inven-
tory, which included the account in Mrs. Hatch's estate, the probate
court, the court of appeals, and the supreme court all held the account
to be no part of the estate. The supreme court said that at the time
the contract of deposit was signed, without- condition or reservation,
"the manifest intention was to establish a joint and survivorship ac-
count then and there, in accordance with the wording of such agree-
ment and binding on the bank when brought to its notice. '2 7  Thus,
Mrs. Hatch was not allowed to change her mind, although she could
have terminated the agreement by withdrawing all the money. Fol-
lowing, as it did, the theory of the Scobie case, the court could have
reached no other conclusion.
A4re the Words of Survivorship Conclusive?
Although, as has been seen, the courts of Ohio have insisted that
no right of survivorship exists unless it is created by contract, there
have been instances in which words of survivorship expressed in a
deposit contract have been held ineffective. Also, there have been
instances in which survivorship rights have been implied although
they were not expressed 28 This apparent anomaly is, of course, not
a legal fallacy, because contracts of deposit are no different from
other contracts in that they are subject to the defenses of fraud, mis-
take, and duress. More important, however, is the fact that through-
25. 47 Ohio App. 154, 190 N.E. 588 (1933).
26. 154 Ohio St. 149, 93 N.E.2d 585 (1950).
27. Id. at 153, 93 N.B.2d at 587.
28. See notes 46-53 infra and accompanying text. Subsequent to the writing of this article,
the Ohio Supreme Court in Fecteau v. Cleveland Trust Co., 171 Ohio St. 121 (1960) held
that evidence is admissible to show the "real intent" of the parties with respect to withdrawals
during the lives of both depositors, even though the bank account was carried in the names of
two persons jointly. [Ed.]
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out the decisions, from Scobie on, there is a disposition to determine
the intent of the parties at the time the contract was entered into. If
the survivorship feature is spelled out in unambiguous language, the
parol evidence rule is, of course, a strong obstruction to any effort to
contradict the express terms of the agreement.
In Schmitt v. Schmitt,29 John Schmitt, in the midst of marital dif-
ficulties, opened two joint and survivorship savings accounts, each
with a different nephew, with deposits of his own money. After
John's death, each nephew assigned the account to John's daughter,
Barbara, and she withdrew the money. His widow, as administra-
trix, sued to recover the money from Barbara.
The court considered the testimony of the parties and concluded
that there was no evidence of an intention to give either nephew a
vested interest during the uncle's life, but only a right to take after
death. The court said the Scobie case applied only where there was
an intention to transfer a present vested interest in the account. The
court, not unreasonably, saw only an effort to circumvent the rights
of the surviving spouse. However, the court did suggest that if the
decedent had entered into a bona fide joint and survivorship account
with Barbara, it could not have been attacked, irrespective of the
motive.
In Held v. Myers,30 a man about to go to a hospital for observa-
tion, but not anticipating death, added, in joint and survivorship
form, the name of an old friend to his account and gave him the
power to sign, at the suggestion of an officer of the savings and loan
association. The court of appeals, affirming the trial court, held
that the funds belonged to the decedent's estate, not to the survivor.
The court held that under the Scobie case, there must be an intention
to transfer a present interest, and no such intention appeared. The
friend's name was added simply as a matter of convenience. The
court also said that evidence of family feelings and relationships was
admissible to assist in the determination of the decedent's intention.
The court, citing a decision in which a deed of trust was impressed
on real estate,"1 held that parol evidence was admissible to show the
existence of a trust.32
Fraud in the inducement of a deposit contract is also sufficient to
upset the right of survivorship. In Steiner v. Fecycz,"3 where the
evidence showed that the survivor obtained the agreement of the de-
29. 39 Ohio App. 219, 177 N.E. 478 (1928).
30. 48 Ohio App. 131, 192 N.E. 540 (1934).
31. Boughman v. Boughman, 69 Ohio St. 273, 69 N.E. 430 (1903).
32. See Note, 6 OHIO ST. L.J. 1954 (1940), where it is suggested that only by construing
the Scobie case as one of gift could the court in Held v. Myers justify the admission of evi-
dence to show that the testator did not intend to pass a property interest when he opened an
account in joint and survivorship form. See also In re Estate of Voegeli, 108 Ohio App. 371,
161 N.E.2d 778 (1959).
33. 72 Ohio App. 18, 50 N.E.2d 617 (1942).
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ceased to change his account to joint and survivorship form through
a false representation that the funds would be used solely for funeral
and burial expenses of the deceased, the court impressed a trust in
favor of the estate of a deceased depositor on the balance in the ac-
count. The court, in Ferguson v. Deuble,34 applied constructive trust
principles in an action between living co-depositors. And in Hovanec
v. Ondak,5 it was held that the trial court properly admitted evidence
to the effect that a joint and survivorship account of mother and
daughter had been created solely for the purpose of paying the moth-
er's funeral expenses.
In Fayen v. Cleveland Trust Company,36 to determine ownership
of an account for the purpose of set-off, the court stated that the
signature card was not conclusive and admitted evidence of surround-
ing circumstances. So also, evidence bearing on the competency of
the depositor at the time the account was created is admissible."
On the other hand, in a brief per curiam opinion, the Cuyahoga
County Court of Appeals in Kipp v. Kipp,8" said bluntly: "[T]he
rights of the parties to a joint and survivorship deposit account are
based wholly upon contract and no terms or conditions not expressed
in the contract are implied or recognized." '
Thus, the confusion with respect to "contract" or "gift" is re-
flected in the application of the parol evidence rule. If the matter
is treated solely and purely as a contract matter, and the contract is
unambiguously expressed, then the parol evidence rule should prevent
proof of a contrary intent. On the gift theory, however, intention is
vital, and parol evidence is admissible to establish such intention.
The tendency of many courts has been to fall back upon talk of
gifts and of intention of the parties to justify the admission of parol
evidence to accomplish what may, in particular instances, be a just
result, i.e., the negativing of the express provision for survivorship.
In view of the diversity of approaches used by the courts, one can
hardly say, despite the holding in Kipp v. Kipp, that the language of
survivorship in the deposit agreement is irrebuttable.
Whatever may have been the basis of the reasoning in the various
cases, there can be no doubt that in the absence of special circum-
stances which would vitiate or modify the deposit contract, funds in
an account in two names, where the deposit is dearly expressed to be
payable to the survivor on the death of one depositor, pass to the sur-
vivor entirely independent of the decedent's estate. This is the gen-
eral proposition, now well established in Ohio, but like any general
34. 27 Ohio L. Abs. 533 (Ct. App. 1938).
35. 124 N.E.2d 774 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955).
36. 9 Ohio Supp. (N.E. Reporter) 148 (C.P. 1942).
37. Richardson v. Richardson, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 497 (Ct. App. 1938).
38. 101 N.E.2d 782 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950).
39. Ibid.
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rule, it has its exceptions. Supposedly well established rules of law
sometimes stretch and twist under the pressures of strongly felt per-
sonal interests and special fact situations.
ACCOUNTS WHERE No SURVIVORSHIP EXPRESSED
In General
If, as indicated by the discussion above, it is necessary to "spell
out" the right of survivorship in order that such a right shall exist,
what then of accounts in two or more names where no words of sur-
vivorship exist? Accounts are sometimes opened in the names of
"John Smith or Mary Smith," with no more explanation, or in the
names of "John Smith or Mary Smith, either may draw," or "John
Smith and Mary Smith, both signatures required. ' 40
In Bauman v. Walter,41 one Celia Walter had deposited $15,000
of her own money in a bank in two accounts, one in the name "Mr.
or Mrs. Edwin M. Walter," and the other in the name "Celia Wal-
ter or Edwin Walter." She retained possession of both passbooks.
Before any money was withdrawn, Edwin Walter murdered Celia.
The common pleas court and the court of appeals held that he was
entitled to one-half of the balance in each account. However, the
supreme court held that the funds in the accounts belonged to the es-
tate of the deceased wife. The court said that where there is no evi-
dence of the ownership of the money deposited, it may be proper to
presume that the depositors have equal interests. Here, however,
it was conceded that all the money had belonged to the wife. If the
husband were to be entitled to any part, some part of the money or
of the bank's obligation must have passed somehow from the wife to
the husband. Here, the wife retained the passbook and retained all
her original right to withdraw. There was no transfer for consider-
ation; no bequest; and there was no gift; nor was there a contract or
promise to pay the surviving depositor (as in the Scobie and Sage
cases). Thus, the wife's contractual right to payment was not ex-
tinguished by her death. The husband had no property interest as
to rights not withdrawn during the wife's life, and his rights could
be no greater after her death than before.
This carefully reasoned decision distinguished the Scobie case on
the basis of the different kind of contract involved. But, because of
the facts, it necessarily had to leave open the question of the hus-
band's rights if he had in fact been given access to the passbook and
had, perhaps, been able to make some withdrawals during his wife's
40. An account in the name of John Smith, on which Mary Smith is authorized to draw, is a
simpler case if it appears that John may at any time revoke the authority; this is actually a
simple power of attorney. Such a "may draw" authority is frequently used as a precaution
in case of a possible emergency, such as the serious illness of the owner of the account, or
temporarily, when the owner is away on a trip.
41. 160 Ohio St. 273, 116 N.E.2d 435 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 947 (1954).
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life. The implication is that if such were the case, a property inter-
est would have been transferred to him during his life. How to
measure that interest in the absence of a contract for payment to the
survivor would be a difficult question.
In an earlier case, In re Estate of Fulk,42 the account in question
was represented by a certificate of deposit reciting that "John or Ida
Fulk had deposited in the Sunbury Savings and Loan Company . . .
dollars to self or to whom the same be assigned." There were no
words of survivorship, but the probate court admitted testimony to
the effect that the funds represented the joint earnings of the deposi-
tors over many years and that at the time the account was opened,
the secretary of the savings and loan association had told the de-
positors that the word "or" indicated the funds would belong to the
survivor upon the death of either. The supreme court held that this
evidence was properly admitted to explain an ambiguity and that the
funds should pass to the survivor. This case was distinguished by
Judge Taft in the Bauman case on the ground that the evidence had
established an account payable to one or the survivor.3
In re Estate of Fulk thus indicated that if no words of survivor-
ship are expressed, parol evidence is admissible to establish the inten-
tion of the parties in that respect. The case is of further interest be-
cause of the passing comment made by the court on a theory followed
in some jurisdictions, but apparently not adopted in Ohio, that in joint
accounts of husband and wife there is a presumption that the right of
survivorship exists, but not in other two-name accounts.44
In Bender v. Cleveland Trust Company,45 a husband who had an
account in his own name for twenty years added his wife's name, tell-
ing the bank's manager that it was simply a matter of convenience as
it was hard for him to get to the bank. The account was marked
simply, "either may draw," on the ledger and passbook. The wife
withdrew the balance a week before the husband's death. In the dis-
pute between the survivor and the estate of the deceased husband, the
supreme court, affirming the court of appeals, held that in the ab-
sence of a provision for survivorship, it is necessary to look for the
prerequisite of a gift inter vivos, namely, a completed delivery. The
court thought that the circumstances had indicated no intention at all
to make a completed gift - there was no delivery coupled with an in-
tention to pass the property as a gift. In fact, the court thought the
words "either may draw" expressly excluded any survivorship fea-
ture. The court held that the wife's action in withdrawing the funds
constituted her a constructive trustee.
Bauman v. Walter, In re Estate of Fulk, and Bender v. Cleveland
42. 136 Ohio St. 233, 24 N.E.2d 1020 (1940).
43. 160 Ohio St. 273, 278-79, 116 N.E.2d 435, 438 (1953).
44. 136 Ohio St. 233, 237, 24 N.E.2d 1020, 1022 (1940).
45. 123 Ohio St. 588, 176 N.E. 452 (1931).
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Trust Company have one thing in common: In each case the court
felt it necessary to look to the surrounding circumstances to determine
the intention of the parties. The gift question, so pointedly mini-
mized in the Scobie case, continued to be considered by the court, with
the result that one can only conclude that the "present vested inter-
est" theory, with its attendant disregard of the gift question, is lim-
ited to cases where the right of survivorship is expressed or can be
shown by strong parol evidence.
There have been a number of lower court decisions involving ac-
counts where no right of survivorship was expressed. The fact situ-
ations which give rise to such cases are, of course, unlimited, and for
that reason some of the lower court cases may serve as guides or in-
dications of probable interpretations to be placed on the supreme
court decisions in cases involving varying facts.
Survivorship Implied Though Not Expressed
In a few cases, the courts have been willing to find a right of sur-
vivorship, even though none was expressed in the contract of deposit.
Thus, in In re Estate of Shangle,46 it was held that certificates of
deposit purchased by a husband, payable to him or his wife, passed
to the wife at the husband's death, where at the time of purchase the
husband had told the bank that he wanted his wife to be able to draw
the money after his death. The court thought this sufficient to es-
tablish a right of survivorship by contract. Similarly, in In re Estate
of Burns,47 the court, after citing In re Estate of Hutchison,48 found
sufficient evidence of a contract in Burns' conversation with his
banker, his wife, and others, indicating that he wanted to provide for
his wife after his death by means of the certificates of deposit in
question. The court said the transaction must be measured by all the
circumstances which surrounded the preparation and delivery of the
certificates, not by what was done with them afterward.
A little different twist appeared in the case of Bowerman v. Bow-
erman,49 where the husband and wife had in their home a cash fund,
representing earnings from their tourist home, a farm, and other
sources, in which each deposited money and from which each drew
money as the occasion warranted. The court thought that each had
created in the other a power coupled with an interest - "the power
to appropriate for his or her own use . .. any part of the joint
fund.... .-o This power did not terminate with the death of one of
the owners of the fund; it was irrevocable by contract; and the sur-
46. 32 Ohio L. Abs. 621 (Ct. App. 1930).
47. 21 Ohio L. Abs. 148 (Ct. App. 1935).
48. 120 Ohio St. 542, 166 N.E. 687 (1929). See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
49. 67 Ohio App. 425, 35 N.E.2d 1012 (1941).
50. Id. at 428, 35 N.E.2d at 1014.
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vivor was entitled to all the fund. One judge dissented on the ground
that there was no evidence to prove any right of survivorship.51
Parol evidence was held admissible to establish a right of survi-
vorship in a case where it was claimed that the bank employee had in-
advertently failed to add the words "or survivor" to the deposit
agreement. In another case, a bank employee's testimony that the
purchaser had said he wanted either depositor to be able to get the
money was held sufficient to establish a right of survivorship."
Thus, if survivorship language expressed in the agreement is oc-
casionally ineffective, conversely, in certain circumstances, the right
of survivorship accrues although not "spelled out." This result can
be reached logically by treating the deposit contract as ambiguous so
as to admit parol evidence to clarify the ambiguity and, thus, estab-
lish a contract for survivorship. This does no violence to the "con-
tract" theory. But, as has been seen, the same result is sometimes
sought to be reached by finding an intention to make a gift. This is
inconsistent with the contract theory, but ends in the same result.
The Presumption of Equal Ownership
In Bauman v. WJalter,5 4 heretofore discussed,5" the court indicated
that a presumption of equal ownership in an account may be justified
where there is no evidence of the ownership of the funds deposited.
As will be seen, this may lead to complications with respect to the col-
lection of taxes56 and the claims of creditors,57 but it makes sense if
there is actually no such evidence. The bank, faced with the dilemma
of to whom to pay the funds in the account, may protect itself by ask-
ing the survivor and the representative of the decedent's estate to sign
the withdrawal, but this solution will not be available when a dispute
arises between the parties as to ownership of the funds.
Frequently cited is the case of Foraker v. Kocks,58 in which a cer-
tificate of deposit issued in the name of "Bernard or Catherine Noon
or either of them," and a United States bond in the name of "Ber-
nard Noon and Catherine Noon" were held to belong equally to the
survivor and to the decedent's estate. The court could find no words
of survivorship or any intention to create such a right, though it did
suggest that the right could arise through "declarations to the bank"
or through "notations." The Foraker case was followed in In re
51. Id. at 431, 35 NE.2d at 1015 (dissenting opinion).
52. Smith v. Ross, 29 Ohio L. Abs. 553 (Ct. App. 1939).
53. Hittle v. Gagle, 78 NXE.2d 764 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948).
54. 160 Ohio St. 273, 116 N.E.2d 435 (1953).
55. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
56. See note 83 infra and accompanying text.
57. See notes 69-79 infra and accompanying text.
58. 41 Ohio App. 210, 180 N.E. 743 (1931).
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Estate of Thatcher,5 9 where the depositors, a husband and wife, died
within three days of each other. The court held that half belonged
to the estate of each, there being no evidence to destroy the presump-
tion that they held the accounts as tenants in common. In Baker v.
Dollar Savings and Trust Company,60 the husband added his wife's
name to his account, but with no words of survivorship. The funds
deposited represented the husband's wages. The court of appeals
affirmed the judgment of the common pleas court, dividing the ac-
count equally. A similar division was ordered in In re Chittock's
Estate,61 where the savings account was in "either may draw" form.
RELATED PROBLEMS
Two-name bank accounts, in survivorship form and otherwise,
exist in Ohio by the hundreds of thousands. Inevitably, they cause
certain recurring problems, some capable of solution on the basis of
decided cases, others requiring practical "rule of thumb" solutions.
The balance of this article will be concerned with some of those prob-
lems.
Conflicting Testamentary Provisions
A good deal of confusion and bitterness occasionally arises be-
cause the provisions of a will conflict with the terms of the bank ac-
count. John Smith may have added his son Tom's name to his ac-
count, making it joint and survivor, and thereafter may decide he
would rather favor his daughter, Jane. So he provides in his will
that Jane shall have all his money in the bank, or he may even refer
to the specific account. The groundwork has now been laid for a
first class family feud. This, of course, is the result of thoughtless
planning, or of pure carelessness, or, more likely, of a layman's mis-
understanding of the nature of the joint account and its legal conse-
quences.
Under Ohio law, the account would not ordinarily be part of
John's estate, but would belong entirely to Tom upon John's death.
In Gladieux v. Parney,62 the testator devoted an entire paragraph in
a codicil to his will to a futile effort to change the right to receive the
proceeds of a savings account and of government bonds which were
in survivorship form:
My savings deposits and my United States bonds are in my name
and that of my wife. That is money that belongs entirely to me, and the
bonds also represent my own money. I am sure my wife would not want
any of this nor would I want any of her funds and I direct said deposits
59. 30 Ohio N.P.(n.s.) 515 (P. Ct. 1933).
60. 15 Ohio L. Abs. 385 (Ct. App. 1933).
61. 106 N.E.2d 320 (Ohio P. Ct. 1952).
62. 93 Ohio App. 117, 106 N.E.2d 317 (1951).
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and the proceeds from said bonds be placed in the body or residue of my
estate and be divided as specified in said Item V of my willY3
The court of appeals had no difficulty in holding that the survi-
vorship account went directly to the survivor. It ruled to the con-
trary as to another account in which no survivorship rights were ex-
pressed, holding the evidence insufficient to establish a right of sur-
vivorship. With respect to this latter account, the court said that the
codicil was merely a self-serving declaration, not in any way tending
to establish the actual ownership or title to the accounts and bonds.
In Bennett v. Bennett, 4 it was held that neither the deposit con-
tract of a joint and survivorship account nor the terms of a life in-
surance policy could be changed by a stipulation in the residuary
clause of a will.
On any contract theory, of course, these decisions are incontest-
ably correct, if there was no ambiguity in the contract. However, it
is interesting to contemplate whether the language of a will could be
used to clarify an ambiguity, or perhaps to assist in determining the
intention of the deceased depositor. If as much emphasis is to be
placed on intention as has previously been done, would not the lan-
guage of a will, executed with proper solemnity, be the very best evi-
dence of intention?
The "Half and Half" Statute
Another complication incident to the right of survivorship is the
application of the so-called "half and half" statute, Ohio Revised
Code section 2105.10, which controls the descent and distribution of
identical property held at death by the relict of a deceased husband or
wife, which property was received from the deceased spouse "by deed
of gift, devise, bequest, descent or by an election to take .... 65
That no part of the money which came to the relict by means of
a right of survivorship is controlled by the statute was established by
Berberick v. Courtade0 6 The court quite properly held that the
63. Id. at 119, 106 N.E.2d at 318.
64. 70 Ohio App. 187, 45 N.E.2d 614 (1942).
65. OmoI REV. CODE S 2105.10. "When a relict of a deceased husband or wife dies in-
testate and without issue, possessed of identical real estate or personal property which came to
such relict from any deceased spouse by deed or gift, devise, bequest, descent, or by an election
to take under section 2105.06 of the Revised Code, such estate, real and personal, except one-
half thereof which shall pass to and vest in the surviving spouse of such relict, shall pass to
and vest in the children of the deceased spouse from whom such real estate or personal prop-
erty came, or their lineal descendants, per stirpes. If there are no children or their lineal de-
scendants, such estate, except for the one-half passing to the surviving spouse of such relict,
shall pass and descend as follows:
(A) One-half to the heirs of such relict...
(B) One-half to the parents of the deceased spouse from whom such real
estate or personal property come...
(C) If there is no parent surviving, to the brothers and sisters . . . of such
deceased spouse....'
66. 137 Ohio St. 297, 28 N.E.2d 636 (1940).
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funds represented by certificates of deposits and accounts in survivor-
ship form passed by virtue of the contract and not by deed of gift.
The same reasoning was employed in Riley v. Keel,6" despite the
fact that the widow had erroneously included in her husband's estate
the certificates of deposit which properly passed directly to her as
survivor, and also in Schwaigert v. Titzhum,68 where the widow
cashed joint and survivorship certificates of deposit after her hus-
band's death and purchased a new certificate in her name alone.
Such holdings seem to be practically mandatory under the pre-
vailing theory in Ohio that the right of survivorship arises as a mat-
ter of contract, rather than upon principles of gift. At least in the
"half and half" cases, the courts have chosen to ignore the talk of
gifts which confuses many of the opinions in Ohio, and, instead, have
held strictly to the contract theory.
Rights of Creditors to Reach a Joint Account
Some very practical problems arise in connection with efforts of
creditors to reach funds on deposit in joint accounts. Most frequent-
ly, they are precipitated by the use of the proceeding in aid of execu-
tion, by far the commonest means of enforcing a judgment in Ohio.
If 4 has a judgment against B and has reason to believe B has money
on deposit, A will promptly take steps to garnishee the bank. If B
does have funds on deposit, and they stand in his name alone, 4 will
have no trouble getting an order in aid of execution, under which the
bank will pay the funds to the court for distribution to A. But if B
has only an account in joint and survivorship form with his wife, C,
and the court issues such an order, the bank will be understandably
reluctant to turn over the funds for distribution to A unless it knows
that C's rights are protected. The bank is, of course, in no position
to determine the interests of the respective depositors in the account.
It may ask C to release any interest that she might have in the funds
which are the subject of the garnishment and to agree that the funds
may be paid in accordance with the court order. If C agrees, the
problem dissolves. But if C refuses to waive her rights in the ac-
count, the bank may very well feel required to refuse to honor the
order of the court. The plaintiff, 4, then has the right to sue the
non-complying garnishee bank under section 2715.33, Ohio Revised
Code, which authorizes judgment against the garnishee. 9 At this
67. 84 Ohio App. 313, 85 N.E.2d 123 (1946).
68. 2 Ohio Supp. (N.E. Reporter) 241 (P. Ct. 1938).
69. OHIO REV. CODE § 2715.33. "If the garnishee fails to appear and answer as required
by section 2715.29 of the Revised Code, or if he appears and answers and his disclosure is not
satisfactory to the plaintiff, or if he fails to comply with the order of the court to deliver the
property and pay the money owing into court, or to give the bond required in section 2715.32
of the Revised Code, the plaintiff may proceed against him by civil action. Thereupon such
proceedings may be had as in other actions. Judgement may be rendered in favor of the
plaintiff for the amount of property and credits of the defendant in possession of the garnishee,
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point, the garnishee bank has lost its status as mere witness and has
become a party to a direct action against it.
Because the bank has no direct interest in the funds at issue, a bill
of interpleader seems ideally suited to permit the proper parties to
argue the ownership of the funds. Accordingly, under the authority
of Ohio Revised Code section 2307.29,70 if the bank is sued, it may
file an affidavit of interpleader and ask that both depositors be made
parties defendant in its place. Once service is made upon the de-
positors, the bank may then, pursuant to an order of the court, pay
the funds into the court and drop quietly out of the picture.
The use of interpleader in such situations seems to be well recog-
nized in Ohio.71 However, in one case,72 the right to interplead
failed because of a failure to obtain service on the parties in interest.
This is a very real, but unavoidable, weakness in the interpleader de-
vice. It not infrequently occurs that one of the joint depositors has
departed for parts unknown, leaving creditor and bank in a state of
frustration. The funds on deposit may, as a result, be indefinitely
impounded, and, thus, be of no use to anyone.
No serious attack has been made in Ohio on the right of the bank
to interplead in cases of this kind. Certainly, a just result is best
achieved by putting the real contestants in court. However, it is not
inconceivable that the right to interplead could be attacked on the
theory that the bank has a contract with its depositors and must pay
the funds only as contracted. For example, in a dispute between the
survivor and the administrator of the deceased depositor, the sur-
vivor might well claim that the bank was contractually bound to pay
only him and that it could not avoid that duty by paying the funds
into court. Or, perhaps, in an action by a creditor of one depositor
for what may appear to be owing by him to the defendant, and for the costs of the proceedings
against the garnishee."
70. OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.29. "Upon affidavit of a defendant before answer in an action
upon contract, or for the recovery of personal property, that a third party, without collusion
with him, has or makes a claim to the subject of the action, and that he is ready to pay or
dispose of it as the court directs, the court may make an order for the safekeeping, payment,
or deposit in court of the subject of the action, or its delivery to such person as it directs, and
also an order requiring such third party to appear in a reasonable time and maintain or re-
linquish his claim against the defendant. If, having been served with a copy of the order by
the sheriff or such other person as the court directs, such third party fails to appear, the court
may declare him barred of all claim in respect to the subject of the action, against the de-
fendant therein. If he appears he shall be allowed to become defendant in the action, in lieu
of the original defendant, who shall be discharged from all liability to either of the other
parties in respect to the subject of the action, upon his compliance with the order of the court
for its payment, deposit, or delivery."
71. This was the procedure followed in the leading case on the rights of creditors to reach
a joint account, Union Properties, Inc. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 152 Ohio St. 430, 89 N.E.2d
638 (1949); see note 74 infra and accompanying text. See also Dempsey v. Brighton Bank
& Trust Co., 14 Ohio App. 170 (1921), and Buckeye State Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Fridley, 9
Ohio L. Abs. 293 (C.P. 1930), where there were disputes between the survivor and the estate
of the deceased depositor.
72. Falk v. Security Say. & Loan Co., 54 Ohio App. 395, 7 N.E.2d 668 (1936).
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against the bank to enforce an order in aid of execution, the other de-
positor could object to the bank's interpleader on the ground that the
bank was thus trying to escape contractual liability to him. He might
further argue that by the terms of section 2307.29"8 interpleader is
available only in an action on contract or for the recovery of per-
sonal property. The creditor's action against the bank is certainly
not based on contract, nor is it one for the recovery of personal prop-
erty.
Whether interpleader or some other procedure is used to bring
the matter before the court, the ultimate question is essentially this:
if A has a judgment against B, and B has a joint account with C, what
part of the account can A reach in enforcement of his judgment?
In Union Properties, Incorporated v. Cleveland Trust Com-
pany,74 the supreme court furnished a good part of the answer to this
question by holding that the creditor could reach only that part of the
account "owned" (presumably, "contributed") by the judgment
debtor. The plaintiff had a judgment against one of two depositors
and, to enforce the judgment, commenced a proceeding in aid of exe-
cution, naming the bank as garnishee. The bank refused to comply
with the order in aid of execution and, when sued, obtained an order
of interpleader, making both depositors substituted defendants in the
bank's place. The evidence showed that the other joint depositor,
the wife of the judgment debtor, had contributed all the money in the
account. The court held that the husband's creditor could not reach
the funds in the account.
The court distinguished the cases which concerned survivorship
rights and said:
Here, we are concerned wholly with a subsisting deposit intact and the
rights, intention and attitude of the depositors with respect thereto
during their joint lives. In our opinion, in controversies like the present
one involving the deposit and arising during the joint lives of the de-
positors, the form of the deposit should not be treated as conclusive on
the subject of joint ownership and the door should be opened to evi-
dence that the deposit was in truth made and maintained on a different
basis. In other words, the "realities of ownership" may be shown.75
The court relied principally upon a New York case, Moskowitz v.
Marrow,7 16 which involved not the rights of a creditor, but a dispute
between the survivor and the estate of the deceased joint depositor.
This case turned upon the fact that the decedent, who had created
the account, had at one time directed the bank not to honor withdraw-
als by the other depositor. Mr. Justice Cardozo clearly stated that
73. See note 70 supra.
74. 152 Ohio St. 430, 89 N.E.2d 638 (1949).
75. Id. at 434-35, 89 N.E.2d at 640-41.
76. 251 N.Y. 380, 167 N.E. 506 (1929).
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the case before the court concerned only one thing: the title of the
surviving depositor.
The authority cited by the supreme court in the Union Properties
case is slim at best. Whether the case stands for a just principle seems
questionable. Should not one who obtains the benefits of a joint ac-
count (the convenience, the avoidance of testamentary formality, the
freedom from probate entanglements) assume also some burdens?
It is hard to reconcile Cleveland Trust Company v. Scobie77 and Sage
v. Flueck78 and other cases in which it was held that each depositor
has a present vested interest in the whole account, with a conclusion
that that interest cannot be reached by a joint depositor's creditors,
to the extent he can show it originated with the other depositor. It
seems only fair that if the judgment debtor has free access to the
funds in the account, his creditors should have the same right. It
may well be asked whether this is an unwitting extension of the spend-
thrift trust theory to a new field.
It is interesting that the court of appeals held directly to the con-
trary in an unreported case, Moreland-Cormere 4partments, Incor-
porated v. Parsons.79 The court affirmed without opinion the hold-
ing of Judge Lausche that the creditor could step into the shoes of
the judgment debtor so far as the right to funds in the joint account
was concerned; hence, all the funds in the account could be reached by
the judgment creditor of but one of the depositors.
Although garnishments of joint bank accounts are everyday oc-
currences, the Union Properties case appears to be the only one that
has reached the Supreme Court of Ohio. This may possibly be ex-
plained by the relatively small amounts of money at issue in most of
the cases. By making the creditor's right to recover depend upon
proof of ownership of the funds in the account, the supreme court has
probably effectively discouraged many new cases.
A large bank having numerous accounts must consider as one of
the unavoidable hazards of doing business the handling of the many
orders in aid of execution served upon it. Attachments and creditor's
bills are less frequently used, but restraining orders to tie up bank
accounts have become almost "standard operating procedure" in di-
vorce cases, and the Internal Revenue Service has moved into the pic-
ture with increasing use of the notice of federal tax levy to reach
funds in bank accounts of delinquent taxpayers.
Restraining Orders in Divorce Cases
A very practical problem to banks is that posed by the distraught
husband or wife who notifies the bank not to allow any further with-
77. 114 Ohio St. 241, 151 N.E. 373 (1926).
78. 132 Ohio St. 377, 7 N.E.2d 802 (1937).
79. No. 16309, Ohio Cuyahoga County Ct. App., 1938, affirming No. 458092, Ohio Cuya-
boga County C.P., 1937.
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drawals from a joint account by the other spouse. Such "marital dif-
ficulty" problems may arise from a telephone call, from a hasty ap-
pearance at the bank, from a letter, or even from the good offices of
a sympathetic neighbor. Inevitably, the other depositor soon appears
at the bank and demands some money from the account, or wants to
close it, emphatically asserting his right to draw, as plainly provided
in the passbook and on the signature card. "To pay or not to pay"
is immediately a delicate problem, unilluminated by any Ohio case
law. The resolution of this problem is usually an adamant refusal
to pay either depositor unless both sign the withdrawal order. This
action can be supported upon two theories: (1) that the deposit con-
tract is a three-party contract which has been breached by one of the
parties, thus fixing rights as of that time; and (2) that in a dispute
between living depositors, actual ownership of the funds in the ac-
count becomes a matter of proof. In neither case is the bank in a
position to decide the rights of its depositors.
In Union Trust Company v. Hutchison,8" which involved a dispute
between the survivor and the estate of the deceased depositor, the court
indicated that although by statute the bank is protected in paying to
the survivor, it cannot blithely do so in the face of a protest by the
heirs at law, and that it would pay at its peril. The same rule would
no doubt apply during the lives of the depositors."'
Informal attempts to tie up funds in a joint account (or even in
an account in one name only) frequently precede the filing of a di-
vorce case and the attendant temporary restraining order. 2 In
Cuyahoga County such temporary restraining orders are granted al-
most automatically "as prayed for," i.e., in the language of the
prayer of the petition. The restraining order may be against the de-
positor alone, but usually it is against the bank and the depositor. In
many instances, however, commercial accounts are excepted on the
theory that such an account is necessary to the defendant's business.
No special problems arise respecting joint accounts, except that oc-
casionally the plaintiff's restraining order may result in impounding
a joint account on which the plaintiff also intended to draw. Again,
the bank is in no position to determine ownership of the fund and
will hold the entire account even though it means refusing withdraw-
als by the person who obtained the restraining order in the first in-
stance. This is a rule of reason, reserving to the court the right to
determine the interests of the parties in the account.
80. 27 Ohio App. 284, 161 N.E. 222 (1927).
81. See Ferguson v. Deuble, 27 Ohio L. Abs. 533 (Ct. App. 1938) and In re Estate of Fox,
36 Ohio L. Abs. 349 (P. Ct. 1942), both holding that in a dispute between living co-deposi-
tors, proof must be had to determine the ownership of each in the account; see also Hummel v.
Hummel, 133 Ohio St. 520, 14 N.E.2d 923 (1938), wherein a joint judgment against both
depositors was upheld where one depositor had improperly placed in the account, with full
knowledge of the other, funds which rightfully belonged to the plaintiff.
82. Under the authority of OHIO REV. CODE § 3105.20 (1953).
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The Federal Tax Levy
The increasing use by the Internal Revenue Service of the tax
levy as a means of reaching funds in the taxpayer's bank account
poses problems similar to those created by the order in aid of execu-
tion. Section 6331 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 authorizes
the collection of a delinquent tax "by levy upon all property and
rights to property" belonging to the taxpayer. Section 6332 requires
any person in possession of, or obligated with respect to, property
subject to levy and upon which a levy has been made to surrender
such property upon demand. In practice, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice serves upon the bank a brief "notice of levy" which informs the
bank that all moneys or other obligations owing from the bank to the
taxpayer are levied upon and seized, and that demand is made for the
amount necessary to satisfy the liability, or any lesser amount the
bank may have.
Immediately, the question arises as to what effect such a levy has
upon funds in a joint account. The Internal Revenue Service has
ruled that:
A joint checking account is subject to levy only to the extent of a
taxpayer's interest therein, which will be determined from the facts in
each case. Where one of the persons in whose name a joint account has
been established can prove that the funds deposited therein are his sole
property, no levy can be made on such funds to satisfy an outstanding
tax liability of the other. Factors bearing on the question of the extent
of a taxpayer's interest in such an account include the nature of the
tenancy created under State law; the source of the funds deposited; the
intent of the person opening the joint account; and whether in actual
practice the account was under the control of one party even though
the other had authority to withdraw funds from the account.83
Thus, if funds in the account are all the property of the taxpayer,
they should be turned over to apply on the tax liability; but funds not
belonging to the taxpayer should be retained. As in the case of the
order in aid of execution, the bank is in no position to determine the
respective rights in the fund, and it cannot safely turn over funds in
which someone other than the taxpayer may have an interest. It can,
of course, ask the other depositor for a release, i.e., for consent to
pay the funds to the Internal Revenue Service. But if this consent
is refused, it would seem that the bank would have no alternative but
to invite suit and thereafter to interplead.
Incompetence of One of the Depositors
If two persons have a joint account and one of them thereafter is
adjudicated an incompetent, it becomes necessary to determine the
ownership rights of each in the account. The guardian of the incom-
petent is, of course, entitled and required to take charge of his ward's
83. Rev. Rul. 187, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 197.
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share of the account. It is well established that the guardian cannot
continue to hold the account unchanged, i.e., merely substitute his
name for that of the incompetent.
In Abrams v. Nickel, 4 it was held that an adjudication of lunacy
and the appointment of a guardian for one of two parties to a joint
and survivorship account terminated the agreement. The court stated
that from the date of the appointment of the guardian, the incompe-
tent depositor ceased to have authority over the account, and that the
guardian was entitled to whatever interest the incompetent had in the
account. However, the guardian could not become a joint owner, and
could not continue the arrangement."5 The court further held that
each of the depositors had a complete interest in the entire account
and that, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, there must be
an equal division of the account. The implication is that if proof of
contribution in some other ratio could be made, the division would
be made accordingly.
In Ulmer v. Society for Savings,"6 a husband and wife had a joint
and survivorship account. After the wife became incompetent, her
guardian brought an action asking for an equal division of the ac-
count, and obtained such a ruling in the trial court. The court of ap-
peals held that the finding was contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence, there being no testimony that the wife ever owned any of
the deposits made. The court said that if an account must be termi-
nated, it is equitable that each depositor should receive what he put
in, unless the evidence shows that a gift was intended. Here, the hus-
band had not had an opportunity to prove who owned the funds.
The court distinguished Abrams v. Nickel, in which the depositors
were landlady and boarder, on the ground that the equal division in
that case was ordered "in the absence of extraordinary circumstances"
and that in the instant case the marital relationship and duties con-
stituted "extraordinary circumstances."
Abrams v. Nickel was also distinguished in In re Estate of
Jones,87 in which the court held that where the joint and survivorship
account was but part of an agreement that one of the parties to the
account would render services to, and care for, the other, and would
be entitled to the funds in the account upon the other's death, the ap-
pointment of a guardian for such other one could not operate to de-
stroy the vested right which the first party had in the account. The
84. 50 Ohio App. 500, 198 N.E. 887 (1935).
85. See also Chockley v. Jensen, 104 Ohio App. 399, 140 N.E.2d 909 (1957), which held
that where, because of the mental instability of a person, his funds are placed in a joint account
under a contract of deposit requiring his signature and the signature of another designated
as trustee, the delivery of the bankbook by the trustee to the owner, followed by an immediate
redelivery of the same to the trustee, does not constitute a gift inter vivos of the funds in the
account by the owner to the trustee.
86. 41 N.B.2d 578 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941).
87. 122 N.E.2d 111 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952).
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appellate court held that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of
the agreement and in holding that the appointment of the guardian
for the one depositor terminated the interest of the other in the
account. Certainly, there were present here the "extraordinary cir-
cumstances" for which Abrams v. Nickel reserved an exception.
Consistent with the aforementioned cases, it was held in In re
Guardianship of Mayforth,ss that as between the guardian of one de-
positor and the other depositor, extrinsic evidence is admissible to es-
tablish the facts as to the ownership of each, but, absent evidence to
the contrary, the presumption is that their interests are equal.
A potential question, apparently not adjudicated in Ohio, lies in
the use, in joint account contracts in savings and loan associations, of
language derived from Ohio Revised Code section 1151.19, and
analogous previous sections, authorizing payment to either depositor
of all or any part of the account "notwithstanding the death or in-
capacity of the undersigned." '  No case apparently has yet tested
this language where one of the depositors has become incapacitated.
It seems hard to believe that if the "incapacity" were mental and a
guardian were appointed, that the courts would permit transfer of
the entire interest in the account to the other, more fortunate, de-
positor.
It will be noticed that the foregoing cases do not answer the prob-
lem presented when one of the parties is known' to be incompetent in
fact, but when there has been no adjudication and no guardian ap-
pointed. Certainly, there can be no division of the account without
competent parties to agree to it. The incompetent cannot write valid
checks or give binding receipts; but what of the competent party -
can he go on as before, drawing from the account at will, perhaps
even closing it out? It would seem that if the bank knew one of the
depositors was in fact incompetent, common prudence would require
it to pay neither depositor until a guardian had been appointed to
represent the rights of the incompetent. The fact that the reported
cases concern situations where guardians had been appointed should
not be taken as supporting a proposition that actual incompetency,
without adjudication, can be disregarded.
The Treatment of Government Bonds
In passing, it is interesting to note that despite careful Treasury
Department regulations concerning the issuance and payment of gov-
ernment bonds, 0 the survivorship feature has given rise to a few
cases in our courts.
The leading Ohio case is In re Estate of Di Santo,9 1 where the
88. 1 Ohio Supp. (N.E. Reporter) 87 (P. Ct. 1935).
89. See note 11 supra; Ryan v. Henney, 20 Ohio L. Abs. 518 (Ct. App. 1935).
90. Teas. Reg. pt. 315 (1957).
91. 142 Ohio St. 223, 51 N.E.2d 639 (1943).
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supreme court held that Series D bonds registered in the name of one
person, payable on death to a second person, became the property of
the second on the death of the first, and were no part of the estate
of the first person, who was the purchaser. The court approved and
followed Rhorbacker v. Citizens Building Association Company.92
Judge Turner, who had dissented in the Rhorbacker case, said that
that case "must now be accepted as declaring the applicable law in
this state, to wit, that the proceeds of a contract made for the benefit
of a third party are not subject to administration in the estate of the
donor but belong to the person for whose benefit the contract was
made.""3 The court stated that it is necessary to look to the contract
between the donor and the issuer, rather than to any contract between
the beneficiaries. The Treasury Department regulations governing
payment9 4 were expressly incorporated in the terms of the bonds and
thus became part of the contract. Accordingly, the bonds were held
payable to the named beneficiary, as provided by the regulations.
This holding appears to supersede that in Foraker v. Kocks, 95
where bonds were registered in the names of a husband and wife, with
no expression of survivorship rights. The court in that case held that
regulations of the Treasury Department recognizing the survivor as
the proper party to whom transfer should be made exist for the con-
venience of the United States government "and cannot confer title
in the liberty bond, or create a contract of survivorship in the bond
in the State of Ohio, where a contract of survivorship is not pre-
sumed."9  It does not appear whether the Treasury Department
regulations were expressly incorporated in the bond, but the inference
must be that they were not.
Binding force was given to Treasury Department regulations in
Waltenberger v. Pearson,17 In re Taylor's Estate,98 and Lauferswei-
ler v. Richmond." But in Gladieux v. Parney,100 the court refused to
take judicial notice of government regulations where no evidence
thereof was offered, and refused to find a right of survivorship
where none was expressed on the face of the bonds. Similarly, in
Waltenberger v. Pearson,1°1 the court said that in the absence of a
showing of Treasury regulations to the contrary, bonds issued in two
92. 138 Ohio St. 273, 34 N.E.2d 751 (1941), discussed in note 18 supra and accompanying
text.
93. In re Estate of Di Santo, 142 Ohio St. 223, 228, 51 N.E.2d 639, 641 (1943).
94. Treas. Reg. 315.17, 6 Fed. Reg. 2199 (1941).
95. 41 Ohio App. 210, 180 N.E. 743 (1931); see note 58 supra and accompanying text.
96. Id. at 220, 180 N.E. at 746.
97. 81 Ohio App. 51, 77 N.E.2d 491 (1946).
98. 18 Ohio Supp. (N.E. Reporter) 62 (P. Ct. 1943).
99. 8 Ohio Supp. (N.E. Reporter) 76 (P. Ct. 1942).
100. 93 Ohio App. 117, 106 N.E.2d 317 (1951); see note 62 supra and accompanying text.
101. 81 Ohio App. 51, 59, 77 N.E.2d 491, 496 (1946) (dictum).
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names, with no survivorship right expressed, would be presumed to
be owned half by each.
Application of the Ohio Inheritance Tax
While the balance in a joint and survivorship bank account is not
ordinarily subject to administration in the estate of the first depositor
to die, it may be subject to both the Federal Estate Tax and the Ohio
Inheritance Tax. Under the former, the tax is imposed on the entire
balance at the time of death, except to the extent that the survivor can
show he contributed to the fund. 02
Some confusion, now fairly well resolved, has in the past attended
the application of the Ohio Inheritance Tax law to joint and survivor-
ship accounts. 10 3 This confusion may commence in the mind of the
layman when he is told that the account is not part of the decedent's
estate and will pass directly to the survivor, free from the delays of
administration, but that it is nevertheless subject to inheritance tax.
Practically, the survivor first encounters difficulty when he learns
that, regardless of how small or how large the account is, the bank
cannot turn it over to him until he obtains a "tax release."'04 This
unavoidable requirement may seem to him to be entirely contrary to
previous assurances that he would be entitled to the balance in the
account "without going to court."
Under the Ohio statute, when property is held in joint and survi-
vorship form, the accrual of the right to immediate ownership or pos-
session and enjoyment of property by reason of the death of one
"shall be deemed a succession taxable under this section, in the same
manner as if the enhanced value of the whole property belonged abso-
lutely to the deceased person, and he had bequeathed the same to the
survivor by will . . . ."'
In Tax Commission v. Hutchison,10 6 which concerned the taxation
of several joint and survivorship accounts representing the common
contributions of a husband and wife, it was held that one-half of the
balance in the account was the taxable "enhanced value." The court
said that by reason of the death of one depositor, there accrued to
the other an exclusive right to the entire fund which she did not there-
tofore possess. The court, in upholding the state's claim that one-
half was subject to tax, rejected the argument that, because the sur-
vivor had a right to consume the entire estate before as well as after
the death of the other depositor, no additional right accrued to her.
102. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2040.
103. See Douglas, Survivorship as Succession Under the Ohio Inheritance Tax, 24 U. CIN.
L. REV. 87 (1955).
104. OHIo REV. CODE § 5731.42 (Supp. 1959).
105. OHIo REV. CODE § 5731.02 (Supp. 1959).
106. 120 Ohio St. 361, 166 N.E. 352 (1929).
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In Tax Commission v. Reeves,10 7 one-half the value of jointly
owned bonds was taxed, there being some evidence of an inter vivos
gift, and in In re Combs,108 where by far the larger proportion of the
account had been contributed by the husband, that proportion was
taxed in his estate. In In re Kirkham's Estate,09 the court held that
the taxable enhanced value was that portion of the account which, by
reason of the death of one of the joint depositors, had accrued to the
surviving owner or owners in excess of the contribution made by the
survivor. The duty was on the survivor to prove his contribution.
This rule still prevails in Ohio except as to accounts of husbands
and wives, which long have been the subject of controversy. In 1957,
the legislature amended the taxing statute"0 by adding the following
sentence to the provisions for taxation of property in joint and survi-
vorship form:
... provided when the persons holding said property jointly are a
husband and a wife, the survivor shall be deemed to have a succession
taxable to the extent of one-half the total value of the property without
regard to enhancement.
Before this amendment, the practice had been changed from time
to time, there being some reluctance to treat the property of husbands
and wives in the same way as other jointly owned property. For a
time, by reason of an agreement of the probate judges,"' it was cus-
tomary to tax only one-half the total value of the property, but later
in some counties the procedure was to assess the tax on the entire
balance at death, giving the surviving spouse the privilege of filing
exceptions to establish the respective contributions of the depositors.
The new amendment seems to settle the question by arbitrarily stat-
ing that half is taxable, regardless of whether the husband or the wife
contributed the funds in the account. Although the justice of such a
rule is open to question, at least, it has the virtue of definiteness.
Another interesting facet of the tax situation was revealed in In
re Estate of Williams,"2 where it was held that the amount of the
debts and allowances (the widow's year's allowance"13 and property
exempt from administration)" 4 exceeding the assets of the estate
could not be deducted from the joint and survivorship accounts in de-
termining the inheritance tax, and that the widow could not change
this result by waiving her right to the survivorship property. Thus,
it is apparent that the use of the joint and survivorship account may
107. 11 Ohio L. Abs. 154 (Ct. App. 1931).
108. 90 N.E.2d 440 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949).
109. 6 Ohio Supp. (N.E. Reporter) 293 (P. Ct. 1941).
110. OHIO REV. CODE § 5731.02 (Supp. 1959).
111. At their meeting in 1951. This was approved by the Tax Commissioner.
112. 138 N.E.2d 189 (Ohio P. Ct. 1956).
113. OHIO REV. CODE § 2117.20.
114. OHIO REV. CODE § 2115.13.
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possibly result in more, rather than less, inheritance tax in at least one
circumstance.
CONCLUSION
By the slow process of judicial decision, a fairly well defined
theory has evolved in Ohio which makes acceptable the fact that, by
reason of survivorship, ownership of funds in a bank can pass at
death from one person to another without the slightest trace of testa-
mentary formality. This general principle is now solidly established.
Despite the problems which sometimes arise (and which have occa-
sionally required some illogical decisions to resolve them), the joint
bank account appears to be a permanent part of our financial land-
scape.
It is, however, a device peculiarly susceptible to careless use.
Aided and abetted by the ubiquitous rubber stamp, the tendency is to
treat all joint accounts as survivorship accounts, without any serious
consideration as to whether the intended purpose requires the survi-
vorship feature. Most of the litigated cases concerning joint accounts
could have been averted by careful choice, first, of the type of ac-
count, and second, of language dearly establishing the desired ac-
count. Where the survivorship feature is appropriate, it is a simple
enough matter to provide for it in dear and unambiguous language.
The account in two names, without the right of survivorship (the
"either may draw" account) leads to litigation and its use should be
discouraged. The addition of an authorized signer under a simple
power of attorney (the so-called "may draw" authority) is a particu-
larly useful device, especially for elderly persons who may suddenly
become incapacitated, but it should be dearly differentiated from the
survivorship account.
The proper type of account to be used in each case should be de-
termined in the light of the principal purpose sought to be accom-
plished, the tax consequences, the possibility of involvement in credi-
tors' claims, and the possible incompetence or incapacity of one of the
depositors. The joint account has disadvantages as well as advan-
tages. It should never be considered a substitute for a properly
drawn will. Judiciously used, however, it can be a very useful tool.
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